DeRose Keith. Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 4 — Solving the Skeptical Problem.
Contextualism in Epistemology
The Philosophical Review 1 : 1— Dinges Alexander. Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly. Synthese 15 : — Feldman Richard. Upper Saddle River Pearson Education. Feltz Adam and Zarpentine Chris. Philosophical Psychology 23 5 : — Freitag Wolfgang. Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem. Acta Analytica 26 3 : — Hansen Nat and Chemla Emmanuel. Experimenting on Contextualism. Mind and Language 28 3 : — Hawthorne John. Knowledge and Lotteries.
Ichikawa Jonathan Jenkins. Ichikawa Jonathan Jenkins and Steup Matthias. The Analysis of Knowledge. In Edward N. Zalta ed. Kallestrup Jesper. Contextualism between Scepticism and Common-Sense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 1 — Kaplan David. Themes from Kaplan : — Kompa Nikola. Knowledge in Context. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 5 1 : 58— Leardi Stefano and Vassallo Nicla. Modeling and Using Context: 56— Lewis David.
Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 4 — Montminy Martin and Skolits Wes. Defending the Coherence of Contextualism. What contextualism entails is that in one context an utterance of a knowledge attribution can be true, and in a context with higher standards for knowledge, the same statement can be false. This happens in the same way that 'I' can correctly be used by different people to refer to different people at the same time.
What varies with context is how well-positioned a subject must be with respect to a proposition to count as "knowing" it.
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Contextualism in epistemology then is a semantic thesis about how 'knows' works in English, not a theory of what knowledge, justification, or strength of epistemic position consists in. Contextualist accounts of knowledge became increasingly popular toward the end of the 20th century, particularly as responses to the problem of skepticism. The standards for attributing knowledge to someone, the contexualist claims, vary from one user's context to the next. Thus, if I say "John knows that his car is in front of him", the utterance is true if and only if 1 John believes that his car is in front of him, 2 the car is in fact in front of him, and 3 John meets the epistemic standards that my the speaker's context selects.
This is a loose contextualist account of knowledge, and there are many significantly different theories of knowledge that can fit this contextualist template and thereby come in a contextualist form. For instance, an evidentialist account of knowledge can be an instance of contextualism if it's held that strength of justification is a contextually varying matter. And one who accepts a relevant alternative's account of knowledge can be a contextualist by holding that what range of alternatives are relevant is sensitive to conversational context.
DeRose adopts a type of modal or "safety" as it has since come to be known account on which knowledge is a matter of one's belief as to whether or not p is the case matching the fact of the matter, not only in the actual world, but also in the sufficiently close possible worlds: Knowledge amounts to there being no "nearby" worlds in which one goes wrong with respect to p. But how close is sufficiently close? It's here that DeRose takes the modal account of knowledge in a contextualist direction, for the range of "epistemically relevant worlds" is what varies with context: In high standards contexts one's belief must match the fact of the matter through a much wider range of worlds than is relevant to low standards contexts.
Contextualism in Epistemology-A Bibliography
It is claimed that neurophilosophy has the goal of contextualizing. Contextualist epistemology has been criticized by several philosophers. Contextualism is opposed to any general form of Invariantism , which claims that knowledge is not context-sensitive i. SSI claims that it is the context of the subject of the knowledge attribution that determines the epistemic standards, whereas Contextualism maintains it is the attributor.
IRI, on the other hand, argues that it is the context of the practical interests of the subject of the knowledge attribution that determines the epistemic standards. Stanley writes that bare IRI is "simply the claim that whether or not someone knows that p may be determined in part by practical facts about the subject's environment. Thus, any view which maintains that something other than knowledge attributions are context-sensitive is not, strictly speaking, a form of Contextualism.
An alternative to contextualism called contrastivism has been proposed by Jonathan Schaffer.
gatsbyproperty.co.uk/teda-toyota-yaris.php Contrastivism, like contextualism, uses semantic approaches to tackle the problem of skepticism. Recent [ when? This research has proceeded by conducting experiments in which ordinary non-philosophers are presented with vignettes, then asked to report on the status of the knowledge ascription.
The studies address contextualism by varying the context of the knowledge ascription, e.
In the studies completed up to , no support for contextualism has been found  : stakes have no impact on evidence. More specifically, non-philosophical intuitions about knowledge attributions are not affected by the importance to the potential knower of the accuracy of that knowledge. These empirical studies for the most part have not been well designed for testing contextualism, which claims that the context of the attributor of "knowledge" affects the epistemic standards that govern their claims.
These studies are more relevant to the evaluation of John Hawthorne's "Subject-Sensitive Invariantism" or Jason Stanley's "Interest-Relative Invariantism"—views on which the stakes for the putative subject of knowledge can affect whether that subject knows—than they are of contextualism. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about epistemological contextualism. However, if the method consists in looking at the sky, then as we can assume in the example the chances of arriving at a true belief about the airline by using the method are pretty low, even if we add that circumstances are normal; given this method, Anna's belief is not reliable because the method isn't.
Between these two methods might lie another method: looking at the sky with one's glasses on. On Baumann's contextualist view, sentence 1 is context-sensitive in just this way. Spoken by someone who is thinking of Anna's method as the method of looking at the sky without reference to visual aids , 1 will express a falsehood; but if the speaker is thinking of the method as looking at the sky with glasses and supersight eyedrops , 1 will express a truth.
Baumann says that speakers "typically" have in mind consciously or subconsciously the relevant disambiguations. But not always -- "if not, then the speaker or thinker fails to make an attribution" 45, fn.
I worry that Baumann underestimates the prevalence of such cases. In the Anna case, Baumann assumes that the attributor knows much about Anna's situation -- that she's looking at the sky with glasses and eyedrops. But 'knows' discourse does not require such familiarity.
If I have no idea how Anna may or may not be investigating her celestial situation, I certainly won't be thinking of her method as one that does, or does not, invoke glasses. Baumann's version of contextualism seems to imply that one cannot express contentful thoughts about subjects while agnostic about what methods they're using. My other main concern with Baumann's approach to reliability is that it allows speakers' interests to screen off epistemically relevant considerations in implausible ways. Consider Anna again, supposing this time that our speaker is focused on the general method of looking at the sky, without reference to glasses or eyedrops.
On Baumann's view, our speaker's context is one in which 1 is false because Anna's belief counts as no more reliably produced than one produced by looking up in the sky without glasses. In other words, in that context, 2 is true, and so 3 is as well:. Consequently, Baumann's contextualism is skeptic-friendly in a surprising way. It is one thing to say, as most contextualists do, that there are very skeptical contexts where even one's technologically assisted vision isn't enough for perceptual knowledge; it's quite another to suppose that in some contexts, someone's visual belief aided by glasses doesn't count as "known" because without glasses, one's perceptual faculties are insufficiently reliable.
This might be plausible if Anna forms her belief without regard to whether she is wearing glasses. But this is no part of the case Baumann constructs. We may suppose -- this is the natural way to interpret the case -- that, if Anna had no glasses, and so ended up with quite an indistinct impression of the details of the plane, she would have remained agnostic about what company's plane it was.
So Anna exhibits sensitivity to her evidential situation.
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